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Pollution and other environmental issues have traditionally
been treated as domestic issues. However, the effects of envi-
ronmentally-unsound behavior do not obey political boundaries;
pollution freely crosses national borders. As one commentator
aptly stated, "Itihe jurisdictional reality of nation-states has long
clashed with planetary ecology 'not arranged in national com-
partments.""
Domestic policy-making procedures fail to solve international
environmental problems for several reasons. First, political sys-
tems, such as our own, are designed to represent the interests
of their constituents. Second, conventional political methods fail
to consider the effects felt outside national boundaries. Further-
more, under the traditional model, the interests of those outside
our borders are not encompassed by the circle of interests that
shape policy, even though the neighboring populations experi-
ence the very real consequences and costs of actions taken within
our borders.
The international nature of the acid rain problem complicates
the process of developing an effective solution. The difficulty of
controlling emissions that create acid rain stems from the fact
that individuals living in the vicinity of Midwestern coal-powered
electric generators do not experience the ill effects produced by
those generators. The effects are transported by the air currents
to Canada and states of the Northeast. The generators have no
* Business Manager, KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL; J.D., 1993, University of Ken-
tucky; B.S., 1990, Vanderbilt University.
I Joel A. Gallob, Birth of the North American Transboundary Environmental
Plaintiff• Transboundary Pollution and the 1979 Draft Treaty for Equal Access and
Remedy, 15 HRv. ENVT. L. REv. 85, 85 (1991).
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incentive, nor are they forced to consider the transboundary
effects of their behavior. The problem of acid rain and trans-
boundary pollution places two regions of this country, as well
as two nations, Canada and the United States, on opposing
sides.
This Note discusses the problem of acid rain in the context
of Canadian-American relations. First, the history of transboun-
dary problems between the two countries and past diplomatic
efforts to address transboundary problems will be examined.'
Second, this Note will look at how the domestic policy of the
United States Clean Air Act and the Canadian Clean Air Act
attempt to consider transboundary effects of air emissions.' The
probable effect of the Clean Air Act Amendments and the
United States-Canadian Agreement on Air Quality signed in
March 1991 will be discussed.4 Finally, the availability of tradi-
tional legal redress for the harmful effects of transboundary air
pollution will then be discussed as an alternative control.3
I. PAST DnLOMTIC EFFORTS TO ADDRESS AMERICAN-
CANADIAN TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION PROBLEMS
A. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
Transboundary air pollution has long been an issue of dip-
lomatic efforts between Canada and the United States. Unlike
European countries which typically utilize an existing interna-
tional organization to address transboundary problems, Canada
and the United States have sought solutions to their common
problem of acid rain through bilateral agreements and negotia-
tion.
6
Diplomatic efforts to deal with transboundary air pollution
began with the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 negotiated
between Great Britain 7 and the United States.' The treaty's use
2 See infra notes 6-36 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 37-71 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
6 JuTTA BRUNNEE, ActD RAIN AND OzoNe LAYER DEPLETION: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND REGULATION 192 (1988).
At that time Canada was under British control.
JOHN E. CARROL., ENVIRONMENTAL DEPLoMAcY: AN EXAMINATION AND A PRO-
SPECTnvE OF CANALsu-U.S. TRANsBouNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONS 39 (1983)
[hereinafter CARROLL, ENvmoNmENTAL DIPLOMACY]; BRUNNEE, supra note 6.
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has been expanded beyond its original purpose of regulating
shared boundary waters. Innovative use of the treaty to deal
with other transboundary disputes rests upon the broad language
contained in the preamble which provides:
to settle all questions which are now pending between the
United States and the Dominion of Canada involving the rights,
obligations or interests of either in relation to the other or to
the inhabitants of the other, along their common frontier, and
to make provision for the adjustment and settlement of all
such questions as may hereafter arise, have resolved to con-
clude a treaty in furtherance of these ends .... 9
Most significantly, the treaty created the International Joint
Commission (IJC).' 0 The functions of the IJC fall into two
categories, judicial and investigatory. Any proposal or action
affecting boundary waters or waters associated with boundary
waters must first meet IJC approval. Upon request by either the
United States or Canada, the IJC may investigate issues of
common concern. Unlike its judicial powers, the IJC's investi-
gations serve informative purposes only and are not binding
upon either country."
The IJC's early work and decisions were limited to specific
matters relating to boundary water issues. However, as aware-
ness of environmental problems grew, requests for the IJC to
investigate and to recommend solutions to related transboundary
problems have increased. 2 The IJC's role expanded to encom-
pass issues of transboundary air pollution.' 3
Two bilateral agreements between Canada and the United
States expanded the power and importance of the IJC. The Great
9 Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters, and Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada, reprinted in
CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 315.
o BRUNNEE, supra note 6, at 193; CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra
note 8, at 44; Gallob, supra note 1, at 112-13. This bilateral institution has become the
most important aspect of the treaty. The IJC is made up of six members, equally drawn
from each country.
CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 46-47.
,Z Article IX authorizes the IJC to act upon such requests. CARROLL, ENVIRoN-
MENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 47-48; BRUNNEE, supra note 6, at 194; Gallob,
supra note 1, at 113-14.
,3 CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 48, 316. The IJC's work
in this new area rests upon a phrase in Article IV of the 1909 treaty which states that,
"boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on
either side to the injury of health or property on the other." Id. at 316.
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Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972 and its amendments of
1978 authorized the IJC to identify sources of emissions having
"significant adverse effects on environmental quality ... through
atmospheric deposition . . . . '4 This development expanded the
IJC's authority beyond sources of pollution found along the
borders. 5
While important in the resolution of specific air pollution
disputes, neither Canada nor the United States has used the IJC
to tackle the broad issue of acid rain. However, the IJC has
been involved in two notable transboundary pollution disputes:
the Trail Smelter case and the Detroit-Windsor and Port Huron-
Sarnia problems. The IJC was referred the Trail Smelter case
which involved damage caused to American farmers from a
Canadian smelter. After recommending the payment of damages
to the injured parties, the case was referred to another arbitra-
tion tribunal for final action. This referral eventually resulted in
compensation for those injured and the famous decision regard-
ing transboundary pollution and the doctrine of good neighbor-
liness. 16 It is notable that the IJC, while involved in the case,
did not provide final resolution of the dispute.
Both countries requested the IJC take action as to the air
pollution problems surrounding the area of Detroit-Windsor and
Port Huron-Sarnia. In its request for assistance from the IJC,
both countries authorized the IJC to examine the larger issue of
air pollution problems along the boundary. In response, the IJC
created the International Air Pollution Advisory Board. As to
the problems at Detroit-Windsor and Port Huron-Sarnia, the
IJC identified Canadian and American industrial sources and
recommended a joint institution to address the problem, which
led to the establishment of the International Michigan-Ontario
Air Pollution Board. Many critics argue, however, that nothing
has been accomplished by the IJC or the Air Pollution Board
regarding the problems at Detroit-Windsor and Port Huron-
Sarnia."
The IJC has been an innovative approach to dealing with
common problems arising on the border. In effect, it has insti-
'4 BRUNNEE, supra note 6, at 194-95.
"Id.
" Gallob, supra note 1, at 120; see also BRuNNEE, supra note 6, at 195; CARROLL,
ENVImONMENTAL DtPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 210-11.
" BRUNNEE, supra note 6, at 196; CARROLL, ENIRoNmENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra
note 8, at 212-14.
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tutionalized an acknowledgment of the importance of coopera-
tion in addressing common environmental issues. 8 Though it
has never addressed the acid rain issue directly, the IJC did
focus attention upon the issue'9 and thus, has played a role in
American-Canadian efforts to resolve the issue. However, several
factors limit the IJC's ability to address the problem of acid
rain with any true force. First, the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
confines the IJC to emissions and problems arising along the
border.20 Second, the IJC has no independent authority to con-
sider an issue. Either nation must present a dispute to the IJC
before it may take any action. Likewise, IJC's recommendations
hold no binding force on either nation. 2' Given these structural
limitations, the IJC does not offer a viable solution to the acid
rain dispute. 22
B. The Memorandum of Intent
As awareness about the acid rain issue increased, Canada
and the United States sought to reach a bilateral agreement
addressing the problem in the late 1970's.23 The perceived adverse
effects from the proposed Canadian power plants in Atikokan
and Poplar River drove the United States to the bargaining table,
while the damaging effects of acid rain upon Canadian forests
and lakes readily brought Canada to the discussion. 24 However,
other international events and domestic pressures dampened the
negotiations. The oil crisis forced President Carter to approve
the conversion of oil fueled utilities to coal and consequently,
the hope for reaching a solution to the problem of acid rain
quickly vanished.
21
Although the oil to coal conversion plan seriously under-
mined any attempt to reach a diplomatic solution to acid rain,
, CARROLL, Eh.vnto NmTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 50.
, BRUNNEE, supra note 6, at 198; CARRoLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra
note 8, at 252 (citing the IJC as the forerunner in early recognition of the problem).
" BRUNNEE, supra note 6, at 208.
2, Gallob, supra note 1, at 143.
See Anthony Scott, The Canadian-American Problem of Acid Rain, 26 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 337, 347-52 (1986) (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the IJC).
23 BRUNNEE, supra note 6, at 198.
I, ld. at 199; CARROLtL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 260.
CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIpLOMACY, supra note 8, at 260; JonN E. CARROLL,
AcrD RAIN: AN IssuE n CANADiAN-AMmPicAN RELATIONS 39-40 (1982) [hereinafter CAR-
RoLL, Ace RAIN].
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the two countries were successful in obtaining a Memorandum
of Intent (MOI) in an effort to keep alive the momentum for a
bilateral agreement. Significantly, this document represented an
official acknowledgment by both countries that acid rain was an
"important and urgent bilateral problem .... ."6 Furthermore,
it bound both nations to continued efforts to deal with the
problem through new bilateral agreements and previous agree-
ments like the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty.
27
The MOI embodies a commitment on behalf of each party
to reach a binding bilateral agreement on acid rain and estab-
lished four interim measures to be taken during the development
of this agreement. First, the MOI set a deadline for the beginning
of formal negotiations between Canada and the United States.
Second, it bound each nation to develop new domestic controls
on emissions contributing to transboundary air pollution as well
as to enforce and implement existing controls and limitations.
Third, the MOI reinforced the existing practice of notification
of proposed actions expected to create transboundary air prob-
lems. Fourth, it set up a monitoring and evaluation program for
scientific data, which included the creation of five technical
working groups to provide the data and technical assistance
necessary to the ongoing negotiations aimed at producing a
bilateral agreement to reduce emissions. 2
Generally, commentators attribute the ineffective implemen-
tation of the MOI's provisions and intent with the change of
political administrations in the United States. Many commenta-
tors feel President Reagan did not fully support the MOI, be-
cause his administration failed to place importance upon the
enforcement of emission standards as the MOI had provided. 29
Gradually, the negotiations between Canada and the United
States under the framework of the MOI dissolved during the
Reagan administration. 30 However, efforts to reach an agreement
returned with the Bush administration. As promised during his
BRUNMEE, supra note 6, at 200 (relying on the Memorandum of Intent between
the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States concerning Trans-
boudary Air Pollution of August 5, 1980, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1371 (1981)).
" CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 263-64; CARROLL, ACID
RAIN, supra note 25, at 40-41.
n BrtUNNEE, supra note 6, at 201-02.
Id. at 203-204, nn.334-55.
30 Id. at 205.
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campaign, President Bush reached a diplomatic agreement with
Canada dealing with acid rain."
C. Multilateral Efforts
Both Canada and the United States are signees of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (L.R.T.A.P. Convention). This
document was the first multilateral agreement dealing with trans-
boundary air pollution issues. 2 The L.R.T.A.P. Convention
required the signees to exchange information and reduce emis-
sions resulting in long-range transboundary air pollution as well
as support research on the subject.3 Three protocols were adopted
in accordance with the L.R.T.A.P. Convention, providing for a
thirty percent reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions and a freeze
upon nitrogen oxide emissions. Canada has undertaken action
to implement the provisions of these protocols within its borders.
In fact, Canada passed legislation to reduce sulfur dioxide emis-
sions by fifty percent. However, the United States has been less
than eager to submit to such restrictions.14 As with most multi-
lateral agreements of this nature, the L.R.T.A.P. Convention
contains no enforcement mechanism." A nation may decide for
many reasons to abide by an agreement; however, without the
voluntary commitment upon the part of the nation, the terms
of most of these agreements are unenforceable. 6
II. NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Given the difficulty in reaching bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments and the inherent problems with enforcing such agree-
ments, use of existing legal institutions provides the most
promising answer to the problem of acid rain. The development
of controls and effective enforcement of environmental legisla-
tion in both countries have the potential to produce tangible
results. Direct legal redress for damages resulting from polluting
emissions from American sources also holds great promise.
3, See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
" Gallob, supra note 1, at 123.
" Id. at 123.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
16 Id. at 89.
1992-93]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
A. Statutory Approach
As a general rule, legislation developed in a domestic forum
is shaped by domestic politics and interests. Rarely are the
interests of individuals outside national boundaries contemplated
when formulating policy. However, in the Clean Air Act, the
legislators broadened the scope of interests considered to include
Canadian interests." There are several reasons why the Act's
drafters considered the transboundary effects of air pollution.
First, Canadian interests, both private and governmental, ac-
tively and aggressively lobbied Congress.3" Second, Congress
wanted to promote good relations with the Canadian government
and people. Third, acid rain affects Northeastern states as well
as Canadian land.
Section 11539 of the Clean Air Act addresses the transboun-
dary effects of air emissions from domestic sources. Under this
17 For a discussion of this statutory approach, see Gregory S. Wetstone & Armin
Rosencrantz, Transboundary Air Pollution: The Search for an International Response,
8 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 89, 127-37 (1984); John L. Sullivan, Beyond the Bargaining
Table: Canada's Use of Section 115 of the United States Clean Air Act, 16 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 193 (1983).
CARROLL, Acre RAIN, supra note 25, at 43; CARROLL, EN VIRONMENTAL DipLo-
MACY , supra note 8, at 266.
19 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1983) (Section 115) states as follows:
(a) Endangerment of public health or welfare in foreign countries from
pollution emitted in United States
Whenever the Administrator, upon receipt of reports, surveys or studies
from any duly constituted international agency has reason to believe that
any air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare in a foreign country or whenever the Secretary of
State requests him to do so with respect to such pollution which the
Secretary of State alleges is of such a nature, the Administrator shall give
formal notification thereof to the Governor of the State in which such
emissions originate.
(b) Prevention of elimination of endangerment
The notice of the Administrator shall be deemed to be a finding under
section 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii) of this title which requires a plan revision with
respect to so much of the applicable implementation plan as is inadequate
to prevent or eliminate the endangerment referred to in subsection (a) of
this section. Any foreign country so affected by such emission of pollutant
or pollutants shall be invited to appear at any public hearing associated
with any revision of the appropriate portion of the applicable implemen-
tation plan.
(c) Reciprocity
This section shall apply only to a foreign country which the Administrator
determines has given the United States essentially the same rights with
respect to the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that
country as is given that country by this section.
[VOL. 8:421
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section, the Administrator of EPA shall take action upon receipt
of information or data from "any duly constituted international
agency" that creates a belief that emissions originating in the
United States are contributing to the degradation of air quality
or endangering the public health or welfare of a foreign coun-
try.40 Upon reaching a belief that sources within the United
States are causing adverse affects upon a foreign country, the
Administrator must notify the source states that emissions from
that state are having adverse effects beyond our national borders.
Upon notification by the Administrator, each state identified as
the source of transboundary air pollution must revise its state
implementation plan. A state implementation plan (SIP) de-
scribes how that state intends to meet ambient air quality stan-
dards. Each SIP must receive EPA approval.4 The Administrator
has the authority to withhold approval or force the state to
modify its SIP to consider the effect of its emissions upon
Canadian soil.42 Section 115 also invites the foreign country to
appear at any public hearings pertaining to the revision of the
SIP.4 1 Without such a provision, states ignore the long range
consequences of emissions originating within their borders that
do not adversely affect the surrounding area.
Applicability of section 115 of the Clean Air Act depends
upon corresponding legislation in the foreign country. Subsection
(c) conditions action upon a finding by the Administrator that
the United States has been given reciprocal rights "with respect
to the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in [the
foreign] country as is given that country by this section.""4
Despite the common perception that the United States is the
perpetrator and Canada the victim in the acid rain crisis, Ca-
nadian sources account for a large percentage of acid rain emis-
sions damaging the Northeastern states. Section 115(c) ensures
American sources do not carry the entire burden of reducing
acid rain and that Americans along the border receive protection
from Canadian sources.
4 5
42 U.S.C. § 7415(a). This provision was a part of the 1977 amendments to the
Clean Air Act.
" 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
41 See Wetsone & Rosencranz, supra note 37, at 128.
41 42 U.S.C. § 7415(b).
" 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c).
41 CARROLL, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 255-56.
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The Canadian counterpart to section 115 of the Clean Air
Act is section 21.1 of the Canadian Clean Air Act. Passage of
what is known as Bill C-51 was intended to provide the reciprocal
rights required under section 115 of the Clean Air Act.4 The
Canadian provision states as follows:
Where the Minister has reason to believe that an air contami-
nant emitted into the ambient air by any source, or any sources
of a particular class or classes, in Canada creates or contributes
to the creation of air pollution that may reasonably be expected
to constitute a significant danger to the health, safety or wel-
fare of persons in a country other than Canada, the Minister
shall, . . . recommend to the Governor in Council with respect
to that source or each of those sources, as the case may be,
such specific emission standards in relation to that air contam-
inant . . . as he may consider appropriate for the elimination
or significant reduction of that danger.
47
The passage of this provision in December of 1980 accomplished
two things. First, it provided the reciprocity element required
under the Clean Air Act. Second, it fulfilled the MOI's interim
goal to develop and enforce statutory emission controls.4
B. Application of Statutory Provisions: Section 115, Section
21.1 and the Courts
Passage of section 21.1 by the Canadian legislature com-
pleted the statutory framework for dealing with transboundary
effects of emissions through domestic legislation. This section
was passed to meet the reciprocal rights requirement of section
115(c) of the Clean Air Act. In the last days of the Carter
administration, EPA Administrator Costle performed the last
required act to fully activate section 115's provisions by stating
in a letter to Secretary of State Edmond Muskie and Senator
George Mitchell of Maine that the statutory requirements of
section 115 had been meet. As Costle left office in early 1981,
he left instructions that SIP modification of the source states
should be pursued by the new administration. However, officials
CARROLL, ENviRoNmENTAL DrPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 267; BRUNNEE, supra
note 6, at 131.
4' Gallob, supra note 1, at 127.
CARROLL, Acre RAim, supra note 25, at 43-44.
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under the Reagan administration never undertook such action.4 9
This inaction led to a line of cases dealing with section 115.
The cases of Thomas v. New York"0 and Her Majesty the Queen
in Right of the Province of Ontario v. U.S. EPA5 interpret the
Clean Air Act's approach to transboundary pollution. The first
case, Thomas I, (and later Thomas 11) was an action brought
under section 115 to compel the Administrator to take the nec-
essary steps to require Midwestern States to revise their SIPs to
consider the transboundary effect of emissions.5 2 The plaintiffs
included states suffering from the effects of acid rain, citizen
groups and individuals including Canadian citizens."
In Thomas I, the plaintiffs succeeded in their efforts. The
district court held the requirements of section 115 had been
fulfilled and thus the Administrator must act by notifying the
source states and requiring a SIP revision. The district court
analyzed section 1-15 as having three elements. The first statutory
element was the receipt, by the Administrator, of a report or
study from a duly constituted international agency. The court
held Costle had indeed received such a report from the IJC
describing the effects of acid rain.54 The second statutory element
was the "reason to believe" requirement. The conclusions Costle
drew from the IJC's report sufficiently satisfied the statute's
language that there must be "reason to believe" that emissions
from sources within the United States "endanger public health
or welfare in a foreign country . . . ."" The final statutory
element the court analyzed was the reciprocity requirement. Cos-
tle concluded Canadian legislation gave the United States com-
parable rights to the ones granted by section 115. However,
Costle qualified this conclusion by stating that this determination
may change should "future Canadian actions interpreting or
9 Gallob, supra note 1, at 129; BRUNNEE, supra note 6, at 130-31; CARROLL,
ENVIRONWMNTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 8, at 267.
" 613 F. Supp. 1472 (D.C. 1985), rev'd, 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) [hereinafter Thomas 1].
5- 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Ontario v. EPA].
11 See generally Beverly A. Ohline, Clean Air Act - Transboundary Acid Rain
Pollution Abatement - Administrative Discretion Citizen Suit, 27 NAT. REsouRcEs J.
707 (1987).
" Thomas 1, 613 F. Supp. at 1479.
'" Id. at 1482. Costle relied upon the Seventh Annual Report on Great Lakes
Water Quality issued by the lJC in October of 1980.
Id. at 1482, 1488 (Muskie letter), 1489 (Mitchell letter).
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implementing their legislation [not give] essentially the same
rights to the U.S."' 6
The district court interpreted section 115 as directing the
Administrator to perform certain actions upon fulfillment of the
statutory prerequisites. Once the Administrator has made the
necessary findings, notification must be given to those states
producing the emissions having transboundary effects. 7 How-
ever, Costle's letters to Muskie and Mitchell did not identify the
source states. The district court also noted that the "identity
[of] the polluting states is incidental to giving formal notification
and not a prerequisite to the conclusion that Costle made the
requisite findings under section 115.''58
The Court of Appeals reversed this decision in Thomas II.
The court found that a statement binding future EPA Admin-
istrators to perform particular actions was a statement of "future
effect designed to implement . . . law or policy," as covered
under the Administrative Procedure Act. 9 The court concluded
that if Costle's comments bound new EPA officials to issue
notices of SIP revisions to emitting states, the comments were
in essence a rule, and thus, must be implemented through the
notice and comment procedures of the APA. 6W The Court of
Appeals also ruled that source states must first be identified
before the Administrator is compelled under section 115 to re-
quire SIP revisions.6 '
Following the rulings in Thomas I, a Canadian province,
several states, and environmental groups asked EPA "for a
rulemaking that would essentially set in motion section 115's
international pollution abatement procedures."62 They made this
request for action with supporting evidence and data of findings
of endangerment and reciprocal Canadian legislation, and met
with EPA officials. Litigation ensued when EPA refused to act
upon the rulemaking request citing lack of information to take
-1 Id. at 1483.
17 Id. at 1485.
38 Id. at 1484 n.*.
Thomas II, 802 F.2d 1443, 1446.
80 Id. at 1446-47.
Id. at 1446. (The court's decision was written by Justice Scalia sitting as Circuit
Judge).
Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525, 1529; see generally Dayna Ellen Peck, Envi-
ronmental Law - Clean Air Act Section 115 Requires EPA Knowledge of Emissions
Sources in United States Responsible for Transboundary Acid Rain, 15 SUFFoLK TRANs-
NAT'L L.J. 357 (1991-92).
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action under section 115.63 In Ontario v. EPA, the plaintiffs
argued the EPA's refusal to take action under section 115 was
arbitrary and capricious and that EPA must publish endanger-
ment and reciprocity findings, thus initiating the section 115
process.6
The district court held the EPA official's decision not to
pursue notice and comment under section 115 as to the endan-
germent and reciprocity findings was a final action by the agency
interpreting section 115. 61 The EPA's response to plaintiffs' re-
quest for rulemaking stated:
[Slection 115 is a unitary proceeding which can not be seg-
mented, since the prescribed finding and notification are in-
extricably interrelated. Making the findings in the manner in
which you request would trigger a vast regulatory mechanism
which we currently do not believe we can undertake in an
informed manner .... [Olur present understanding of the acid
rain problem is not sufficient to make a judgment regarding
the state by state, or even the aggregate reductions necessary
to eliminate observed effects. 6
Under the two-part test of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC Inc.,
67
the court found the agency's interpretation of section 115 as a
unitary proceeding "permissible, as it is both entirely reasonable
and consistent with the statutory plan."' 6
The ruling of Ontario v. EPA limits section 115's ultimate
usefulness. The protective measures of section 115 remain inac-
tive until the Administrator makes findings as to endangerment
and reciprocity as well as identification of source states. As
illustrated by this case, the Administrator will not be forced by
the court to make such findings. 69 The court deferred to EPA's
conclusion that it was unable to address the transboundary acid
rain issue due to lack of information. The court justified such
deference by reference to the Acid Precipitation Act of 1980,
which provided for a ten-year study of acid rain to identify the
" Ontario v. E.P.A., 912 F.2d at 1530.
'Id.
I d. at 1531.
Id. (quoting from the court's quotation of a letter written by Mr. Don R. Clay,
acting Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation).
67 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
" Ontario v. EPA, 912 F.2d at 1533.
" Id. at 1534. (finding that the Administrator's refusal to make the required
findings under was not arbitrary or capricious).
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sources of acid rain. The court felt comfortable that the future
results of this study would provide the data necessary to address
the acid rain issue and section 115.70
While section 115 of the Clean Air Act and section 21.2 of
the Canadian Clean Air Act appear to be a solution to the
transboundary effects of acid rain and other air pollution, in
practice the statutory approach has failed to operate as planned.
71
The case law surrounding section 115 casts doubt upon the use
of this section as a meaningful limitation of emissions contrib-
uting to acid rain. Future use of this section is dependent upon
the EPA Administrator making the necessary findings. Unfor-
tunately, the court has proved to be reluctant to compel the
Administrator to make the necessary findings and instead defers
to agency discretion in such matters.
C. The Clean Air Act Amendments
Section 115 is not the only provision controlling the emissions
that produce acid rain. The recent Clean Air Act Amendments
of 199072 dramatically cut sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide
emissions that lead to the formation of acid rain. The amend-
ments call for a reduction in total emissions allowed from util-
ities, and the amendments require utilities to cut sulfur dioxide
emissions to 8.9 million tons by the year 2000 and reduce nitro-
gen oxide emissions by 2 million tons. 73 The amendments also
require reduction in nitrogen oxide emissions from cars, allowing
only 0.4 grams per mile (a 0.6 reduction in the standard).
74
Even though the amendments result in closer control of the
emissions creating acid rain, these statutory controls fail to
completely answer the problem of acid rain for several reasons.
Many commentators believe the Clean Air Act "cannot ensure
adequate protection against acid deposition . . . . "75 Also, emis-
sion levels under the Clean Air Act were not developed solely
" Id. at 1535.
71 While acknowledging that §§ 115 and 21.1 have failed to yield tangible efforts
to reduce acid rain emissions, some commentators have suggested a new role for the
IJC under the framework of these statutory provisions. Wetsone & Rosencranz, supra
note 37, at 135, 138.
Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
" Gallob, supra note 1, at 134-35 (citing Clean Air Act Amendments § 401, 104
Stat. at 2585-2589).
" Id.
,1 Id. at 134.
[VOL. 8:421
Acre RAIN
for the purpose of eliminating acid rain. The Clean Air Act is
primarily a tool for controlling and improving local air quality.
Furthermore, it was not "designed to respond to long range
pollution emissions.' '76 However, a reduction in the emissions
that create acid rain brings us closer to a solution.
D. United States-Canada Agreement on Air Quality
During the Reagan administration, very little progress was
made toward reaching an agreement with Canada concerning
acid rain.77 In fact, negotiations with Canada and efforts to
reduce emissions producing acid rain ground to a stand still.
This impasse was broken by the Bush administration. Under
Bush's term, the Clean Air Act was amended to include more
stringent limitations and an acid rain agreement was signed with
Canada in early 1991. 71 The agreement binds the United States
to meet the emission limitations of the Clean Air Act amend-
ments and requires Canada to adopt more stringent controls on
acid rain emissions and set a cap on sulfur dioxide emissions by
the year 2000. The agreement also incorporates the IJC in its
effort to control acid rain. All formal complaints and disputes
arising from the agreement and acid rain in general shall be
referred to the IJC for resolution. The agreement is a major
step in controlling emissions from both countries that are dam-
aging to their neighbors across the border.7 9
E. Legal Redress through the Court System
As an alternative to action under section 115 of the Clean
Air Act, Canadians suffering injury from emissions originating
in the United States may seek redress directly through the Amer-
ican court system.80 Our legal system provides three methods by
Id. at 134-35.
Sullivan, supra note 37, at 202-06.
" Michael Kranish, US and Canada Sign Acid Rain Pact Benefiting New England,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1991.
Bush Keeps His Word to Canada, Cm. TRm., Mar. 16, 1991 (Editorial).
The American and Canadian Bar Associations produced the 1979 Draft Treaty
on a Regime of Equal Access and Remedy in Cases of Transfrontier Pollution [herein-
after Draft Treaty] to expand the usefulness of the court system to these disputes.
Despite support from these organizations, neither the United States nor Canada adopted
the Draft Treaty. The Draft Treaty's provisions are designed to facilitate the use of the
courts as a control for transboundary pollution problems, by securing the injured party
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which a Canadian may bring suit for acid rain damage. Diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts provides foreigners access to
the federal court system. An injured foreigner may also bring
suit directly under the provisions of a particular state statute
protecting that injured party's interests. Another narrow possi-
bility is to seek Supreme Court original jurisdiction by naming
a state as a party.$'
The only transboundary pollution case brought under federal
diversity jurisdiction is Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division,
National Steel Corp.8 2 This class action suit was brought by
several Canadian residents against American power plants. The
plaintiffs claimed that emissions from the plants were "noxious
in character" and thus constituted a nuisance for which they
were entitled to damages. 3 The central issue of the court's
decision was the issue of joint and several liability. The court
concluded the defendants could be held jointly and severally
liable to the plaintiffs even though the mixing of the emissions
with the air made it impossible to separate specific cause and
effect.8 4 The court never ruled on the actual merits of the case
due to an out-of-court settlement. 5
The Michie decision is notable for several reasons. The emis-
sions at issue in this case were local in nature and did not involve
long-range transport of air pollutants. Nonetheless, this case is
important precedent for the recovery of damages due to trans
boundary pollution. When compared to the Trail Smelter Arbi-
tration, it is apparent that Michie's relief may be preferable,
considering the elements of timeliness and efficiency of relief.
8 6
Canadian plaintiffs have also been successful in bringing suit
in state courts under state environmental statutes. The court held
in Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario
v. City of Detroit8 7 that a foreign plaintiff must show injury in
equal access to legal remedies despite the international character of the injury. The Draft
Treaty provides the injured party "shall at least receive equivalent treatment to that
afforded in the Country of origin, in cases of domestic pollution or the risk thereof and
in comparable circumstances, to persons of equivalent condition or status resident in the
Country of Origin." Gallob, supra note I, at 92-107.
1 ld. at 135-36.
495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 215-16.
' Gallob, supra note 1, at 136-37,
Id. at 137.
874 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1989), rev'g Detroit Audubon Soc'y v. City of Detroit,
696 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
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fact that lies "within the 'zone of interests' protected by the
statute.''88 While this avenue is useful in compensating those
suffering the effects of transboundary air pollution, its availa-
bility is dependent upon the existence of and content of a state
environmental statute. As the court's opinion illustrates, recov-
ery is dependent- upon a finding that the statute protects the
plaintiff's interest.8 9
The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction offers a narrow
opportunity for a transboundary pollution action to come before
the Court if the suit involves a state as a party. 9° In Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.,91 the state of Ohio sought to ad-
dress the polluting of Lake Erie by several chemical companies
across the border in Canada. 92 While acknowledging that upon
its face its original jurisdiction applied to the facts before it, the
Supreme Court refused to allow its original jurisdiction to be
used in that instance. 9 Articulating a need for selective exercise
of this jurisdiction, 94 the Court found Ohio's case did not im-
plicate the policies underlying its original jurisdiction.9 The Court
was also reluctant to become involved in such a complex case
due to the nature of the dispute and the "number of official
bodies ... already actively involved in regulating the conduct
complained of here." 96 It was on this point that Justice Douglas
dissented. He felt Ohio's complaint presented "a classic type of
case congenial to [the Court's] original jurisdiction. " 97 He also
found the involvement of the IJC under the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty did not preclude the Court's involvement.9"
III. CONCLUSION
As with other transboundary issues, there are no easy an-
swers to the problem of acid rain. The approaches taken by the
United States and Canada have been varied, and not all have
88 696 F. Supp. at 253; 874 F.2d at 335.
89 874 F.2d at 336-38.
Gallob, supra note 1, at 136, 139-40.
9t 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
Id. at 494.
" Id. at 496.
" Id. at 497.
" Id. at 499-500.
Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 502.
Id. at 505 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 506-07 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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been successful. However, the long history of open discussions
and negotiations between the United States and Canada on this
subject increases the likelihood a solution may be reached. The
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the Memorandum of Intent
laid a foundation for future progress. The IJC represents an
institutional commitment on the part of both countries to resolve
its environmental disputes. These past efforts laid the foundation
for reaching the United States-Canadian Agreement on Air Qual-
ity and will ultimately aid in its implementation. However, the
amiable relations between Canada and the United States do not
eliminate the inherent difficulties in reaching an effective and
binding diplomatic solution. Despite the desire of both countries
to reach a solution, each will continue to safeguard its sovereign
integrity.
Efforts to deal with this international problem have not been
limited to the traditional diplomatic efforts and agreements.
Given the difficulty in reaching and limitations inherent in bi-
lateral agreements, other methods of control are needed to sup-
plement diplomatic efforts. The national legal systems of Canada
and the United States provide a number of controls. Statutory
approaches such as section 115 and section 21.2 could potentially
control transboundary air pollution problems. However, without
the support and commitment of administrators on either side of
the border to fully implement such provisions they will lie unused
and without meaning. Increased legal action by parties concerned
with acid rain may provide a means to continue to pressure
lawmakers and those responsible for implementing laws to deal
with this politically difficult issue, as well as offer a relatively
speedy method of compensation for acid rain damage. In sum-
mary, the solution to the acid rain problem will ultimately en-
compass many methods and means of cutting emissions. A truly
interdisciplinary approach will yield the most effective results as
no single solution will deal effectively with the entire problem
and its complexities.
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External Harms: Toyota, the Japanese
"Maquiladora," and the Need for
Countries to Regulate Their Nationals
Abroad
Loai S.VANHOOSE*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AT HAND
The words Shakespeare attributed to Macbeth could easily
reflect the current enforcement of international law as it relates
to human rights and the environment: "it is a tale, Itlold by an
idiot, full of sound and fury, [sjignifying nothing."' The struggle
to make this tumultuous field of international law meaningful
begins with an understanding of the regulatory field as it now
exists and ideally draws upon current mistakes to formulate a
policy for the future.
This proposal examines the expanding role of the Japanese
in the international automotive industry, from their struggle to
succeed within Japan to their current status as a formidable
force in the international market.' The role of trade tensions
and the development of Japanese environmental law in the de-
cision to expand production into the United States will also be
assessed.' Finally, the Japanese auto corporation will be com-
pared to the U.S. "maquiladoras," American businesses which
seek refuge in South America to dodge environmental regulations
and thereby gain more favorable operating conditions. 4 This
* Senior staff member, JoURNsAL OF NATURAL REsoUncEs & ENviRONMENTAL LAw;
J.D., 1993, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1990, Georgetown College.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act 5, sc. 5.
C.S. CHANO, TIE JAPANESE AUTO INDUSTRY AND THE AMERICAN MARKET 10-
17 (1981); PHYLLIS A. GENTHER, A HISTORY OF JAPAN'S GOVERNMENT-BusINESS RELA-
TIONSHIP: THE PASSENGER CAR INDUSTRY 24-31 (1990).
3 Id.
I Daniel 1. Basurto Gonzalez & Elaine Flud Rodriguez, Environmental Aspects
of Maquiladora Operation: A Note of Caution for U.S. Parent Corporations, 22 ST.
MARY'S L. J. 659 (1991).
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comparison is intended to illustrate the problems which may
arise when companies are permitted to operate outside their
borders with little or no regulation from their nation of origin.
This study will specifically focus on the expansion of Toyota as
it relates to the establishment of a manufacturing plant in Scott
County, Kentucky. 5 In this analysis, the costs to taxpayers and
the environment will be assessed in light of the actual benefit
received by Kentucky's citizens.
6
Finally, this examination leads to a proposal for the devel-
opment of an international code of environmental conduct.
7
Based upon the premise that every human being possesses among
his or her inherent rights the right to be free from exploitation
and environmental degradation, the United Nations should en-
force the right of all nations to be free from choices between
financial gain and the quality of life.' As an operating frame-
work, the International Declaration on Human Rights establishes
the common denominators which make disparate corporate re-
gulations an affront to good business practice and environmental
integrity.
II. JAPANESE INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Understanding the Relationship Between Industry and the
Government in Japan
The Japanese 6perate under a system of political and eco-
nomic cooperation which is quite unfamiliar to the average
American. This cooperative atmosphere is rooted in the historical
development of the Japanese economy. From the outset of au-
tomotive production, the Japanese struggled to develop and
maintain a viable motor vehicle industry. Unfortunately, early
manufacturing attempts by businessmen, inventors, and other
would-be producers all failed due to financial difficulties. 9 Suc-
cessful production was further hindered by foreign competition
I See Dep't of Highways v. Taub, 766 S.W.2d 49 (1988); Hayes v. State Property
and Bldgs Comm'n., 731 S.W.2d 797 (1987).
6 DAVID GELSANJrEaR, JUMPSTART: JAPAN Comas TO TE HEARTLAND 81-90 (1990).
RAYMOND J. WALDMANN, REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS THROUGH CODES
OF CONDUCT (1980).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217!A(III), U.N. Doc. (1948)
[hereinafter U.N. Declaration].
9 CHANG, supra note 2, at 10-11.
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when, following the Kanto earthquake in 1923,, Ford began
sending trucks to Japan.'0 As the need for vehicles continued
without a domestic industry to meet demands, General Motors
and Ford subsequently began production in Japan between 1924
and 1925." As a result, these two companies controlled approx-
imately 90% of the Japanese auto market until 1934. Their
production finally tapered off due to a nationalistic policy that
led to a "Produce and Buy Japanese Movement.' ' 2 In June
1926, this protectionist philosophy led to the creation of the
Committee for the Promotion of Domestic Products within the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, a group formed with the
primary objective of increasing native manufacturing. Its activ-
ities were carried out in an effort to combat the markedly
unbalanced ratio of domestic to foreign goods. 3 Frustrated with
the slow development of domestic technology, in 1935 Japanese
automakers tentatively proposed joint ventures with American
corporations to gain technology and financial backing. 4 Because
the Japanese sought to implement the automotive industry con-
current with the national defense, this union was entirely con-
trary to Japan's long-term goals." At this juncture, the Japanese
announced an Outline of Automobile Manufacturing Law which
would ultimately prove successful. The purpose of this law was
to exclude the United States from the Japanese automotive in-
dustry in order to develop a strong domestic market. 6
Japan continued to encourage this industry, but the fledgling
automakers experienced numerous challenges. During the recon-
struction period following World War II, Toyota was the only
manufacturer in the war-torn nation initially able to produce
automobiles.' 7 Since the United States was busy meeting its own
domestic transportation needs, the Japanese managed to recon-
struct their pre-war protectionist system and began producing
domestic vehicles once again.'" This action was facilitated by an
agreement signed by the U.S. which excluded the automotive
I d. at 14.
Id. at 15.
2 d. at 16-17.
GENrHER, supra note 2, at 24.
Id. at 18.
I Id. at 31.
' Id. at 30-31.
'I Id. at 43.
' GENT ER, supra note 2, at 45-47.
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industry from paying reparations. 9 It was during this postwar
lull in the Japanese economy that the Supreme Commander for
Allied Powers ironically predicted the rise of Japan's interna-
tional automotive industry, although he did not forecast the
ultimate competitive position it would eventually achieve.
"0
During the Allied occupation, the Japanese developed a pro-
tectionist theory which has allowed government and industry in
Japan to work together effectively. Japanese culture focuses on
achieving harmony, and this goal was perpetuated by a cooper-
ative governmental-industrial effort.21 The Japanese government
carefully nurtured the automobile manufacturing industry, pro-
tecting it from foreign investment and competition. In the 1870's,
this nurturing first found expression in the Japanese term of
"shokusan kogyo" which means "develop industry and promote
enterprise.'" ' They put this philosophy to work when they re-
newed automotive production and succeeded in creating an in-
dustry that has proven strong within Japan's own borders as
well as around the world. Once the industry began to compete
successfully on a global scale, however, this cooperative rela-
tionship began to grow adversarial.73
As the Japanese auto industry became a competitive force
in the United States, trade imbalances caused the U.S. govern-
ment to react with increasing hostility toward imported goods.
Concurrently, the intricate protectionist system which had incu-
bated developing Japanese auto manufacturing concerns effec-
tively limited incoming flows of U.S. autos to a trickle,
exacerbating a trade imbalance already fraught with tension.2
The balance of power had shifted, and the U.S. was on the
receiving end of Japan's market surplus.
B. Environmental Concerns
Around the same time that trade tensions increased, the
Japanese began to react with alarm to environmental degrada-
tion.Y During the early 1960's, the Japanese government became
" Id. at 47.
Id. at 51-52.
21 JuLLAN GRESSER Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw iN JAPAN 18 (1980).
GENTHER, supra note 2, at 15.





increasingly aware of the need for comprehensive environmental
legislation. Problems had arisen due to federal preemption of
local laws, resulting in an absence of any concrete authority to
monitor environmental degradation. 26 A symptomatic illustration
of this conflict occurred in the Mishima-Mumazu region, which
had been targeted by the government as a "special development
zone.' '2 The residents of the area were outraged because their
environment appeared to be on the auction block awaiting the
highest bidder. These citizens mobilized effectively, expressing
their objection to the government's industrial plan.28 As a result
of this internal pressure, the Japanese elected to develop a reg-
ulatory scheme in order to allay citizens' fears by guaranteeing
a minimum environmental standard.
29
The pressure exerted by citizen groups demanding action to
stop environmental exploitation led to the appointment of a
panel of experts known as the Environmental Pollution Com-
mission.30 Significantly, this body was organized as a branch of
the Ministry of Health and Welfare, reflecting the initial em-
phasis in Japanese law on the protection of the environment
only for the sake of human health." This group prepared an
investigatory report to analyze the environmental issues which
Japan faced. Despite differing views, the group consensus was
that parties that inflicted environmental damage must be held
accountable for their actions. They insisted that sweeping legis-
lative reforms were necessary to prioritize health concerns above
industrialization.3 2 Additionally, the group proposed that pollu-
ters be held responsible for liability costs when injuries occurred
and that pollution charges be assessed to fund public works."
Following this comprehensive assessment, in 1967 the Japa-
nese developed a Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Con-
trol.34 This legislation reflected the "social values and attitudes"
of Japanese citizens. The document proposed control of air,
water, noise and other pollution, and the ideas presented spurred
Id. at 19.
27 Id.
GRESSER ET AL., supra note 21, at 19.
" Id.
"0 Id. at 20.
31 Id.
32 Id.
SGRESSER Er AL., supra note 21, at 21.
I' d. at 24.
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specific legislation. The Basic Law acknowledged the shortcom-
ings of existing regulations and specifically outlined remedies in
response to these flaws. 5 One unfortunate weakness of the pro-
posal and the ensuing legislation was the specificity of remedies,
which focused upon the minimization of human suffering while
nearly ignoring the integrity of the natural environment.3 6 How-
ever, a framework was constructed upon which additional leg-
islation could be built in response to evolving knowledge and
concerns.
Remedies in Japanese environmental law became compensa-
tion-oriented in the wake of four pollution cases in the early
1970's.3 7 Thus, Japanese legal doctrine in the environmental
arena has focused on comprehensive pollution control and tort
compensation for health damages almost from its inception. 8
Legislation followed judicial precedent by granting relief to the
injured parties in the form of monetary reparations.
Although environmental law originally focused on personal
rights and health, it has expanded to allow access to less well-
defined legal rights through civil litigation. 9 Interests have come
to be protected because individuals have exhibited their funda-
mental needs to the judicial system, resulting in preservation of
their environment. To illustrate, the Japanese recognize a need
for sunlight as one of these fundamental requirements.40 This
standard, which some Americans would regard as highly unu-
sual, is more easily understood after considering the crowded
atmosphere and overtaxed environment of the Japanese island.
Gradually, the Japanese interest grew beyond just a need for
sunlight. 41 They began to view the use and enjoyment of their
environment as a collective right, unattached to the ownership
of real estate and earned by virtue of their existence as human
beings.42 Subsequently, this expression of fundamental guaran-
3 Id.
Id. at 26.
37 Leigh West, Mediated Settlement of Environmental Disputes: Grassy Narrows
and White Dog Revisited, 18 ENvTn. L. 131 (1987).
3B Id.
" GRESSER ET AL., supra note 21, at 136-38.
• Id. at 139-41.
I d.
• The Japanese Federation of Bar Associations put forth this idea at the 1972
Niigata Symposium on Environmental Protection.
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tees was incorporated into a legislative proposal for a basic
protected environmental right belonging to all people and to be
advanced by the state.43
As this historical study illustrates, the protection of personal
environmental rights within the Japanese state appears to have
been an overwhelming success. One fact amazing to outsiders is
the enforcement of Japanese environmental legislation, which
has had minimal impact on their gross national product and
employment levels." This was first recognized after the pro-
nouncement at the Tokyo meeting of the Organization of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development in 1976, when the Japanese
announced their achievement of slowing environmental harm .
4
At this conference, the Japanese were enjoying a dramatic turn-
around from the 1972 Stockholm Conference, when the Japanese
presented the dismal picture of Japan as a festering wasteland
of environmental degradation." Japan's highly structured system
of government contributed in large part to its successful battle
to protect the environment.4 7 The Japanese bureaucracy histori-
cally served as guardian of "imperial institutions and moral
order." 4 This guardianship is facilitated by the fact that the
administrative system is a closed body which recruits from the
bottom.4 9 The system is also closed in the respect that it drafts
and operates as the principal interpreter of laws. All acts are
based upon statute, however, and there is no discretionary in-
terpretation. 0 This system is successful because of the govern-
ment's traditional relationship with industry through well-defined
administrative channels. A framework for cooperation has long
been in place, and such a framework is arguably necessary for
a system of environmental control to be effective."'
The system is likewise beneficial because the regulations may
be tapered to individual situations. This cooperative effort makes
the government more receptive to industrial input.5 2 There are




'7 GaSSER ET AL., supra note 21, at 229.
" Id. at 232.
,s Id. at 233.
90 Id.
I ld.
'2 GRESSER ET AL., supra note 21, at 234.
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perils, however, in such an internalized focus: the system lacks
review, decisions may be quite arbitrary, and political influences
rule in numerous instances. Likewise, decisions may conflict with
broader societal objectives and be incompatible with interna-
tional commerce and foreign relations, in general.
53
The Japanese system of environmental regulation is highly
specialized, with categories, functions, relevant laws, and juris-
dictions specified for each segment of the department.5 4 Outsi-
ders have difficulty identifying with the critical role that peer
sanction plays in the Japanese culture. The cooperative union
between government and industry makes it relatively easy for
the government to time public reprimands to coincide with citi-
zen outrage. In this manner, the party at fault is publicly dis-
honored, losing face with his or her countrymen." The car
manufacturers found themselves subjected to these higher stan-
dards in personal ways. Such sanctions were used to punish
Toyota when it rebelled against the maintenance of higher emis-
sions standards to satisfy the stringent regulations set forth in
the original Clean Air Act. Although the U.S. waived these
required standards until a later date, the Japanese continued to
view compliance as feasible. 6
Although both the United States and Japan share a common
origin of comprehensive tort legislation in environmental law
which centers on victims' rights, 57 when the United States enacted
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA), it unfortunately lost much of the focus
of its early provisions for toxic tort recovery and third party
compensation in legislative revision.5" The Japanese, however,
enacted the Pollution-Related Health Injury Compensation Law
and the Pollution Dispute Resolution Law, both of which make
for a positive and innovative system that encourages recovery
without litigation.59 Japan's system of dealing with environmen-
tal disagreements is an excellent example of mandatory mediated
dispute settlement.w
I ld. at 237-40.
'" Id. at 252-53.
' Id. at 273.
Id. at 272.






C. The Benefits of Operating in the Udtited States
Toyota believed that tax incentives for the development of
pollution control technology allowed smaller companies to drive
a wedge into the market and increase their market share.6' The
company felt threatened by such competition, since only recently
it had enjoyed the protection of the Japanese government. This
competition for market share most likely impacted Toyota's
decision to expand toward the West.
With the increasingly protectionist stance of the United States
and stricter Japanese environmental legislation, the Japanese
began to target the U.S. market, first with sales franchising and
finally with established production sites.62 By the time the Jap-
anese "invaded" the mainland to establish manufacturing plants,
Japan had an extremely powerful lobby in Washington and
several job-hungry states fighting for the right to grant every
wish to accommodate a Japanese manufacturing concern.63
One example of Japan's influence lies in its lobbying clout,
which allowed the auto manufacturers to reclassify light trucks
for importation into the U.SA4 The U.S. charges 2.5% for
passenger car tariff duties, but light trucks have a surcharge of
25%. 61 While the Japanese used the truck classification to sup-
plement the quota numbers for passenger cars going into the
U.S. in the early 1980's, the transplanted Japanese manufactur-
ing plants were able to meet domestic demand by 1988. For this
reason, export allowances in excess of demand were available at
the 2.5°0 passenger car rate.6 The Japanese were subsequently
able to use their political influence to have their light trucks
classified as passenger cars for import tariff purposes, then
reclassified as trucks once they entered the U.S.(thus enabling
Japan to avoid the stricter emissions standards applicable to
passenger cars.) 67 Thus, they were subjected to lower standards
and lower tariffs due to these strategic classifications.
Incentive packages prepared by individual state governments
to entice the Japanese into expanding their production into the
61 Id. at 254.
PAT CHOATE, AGENTS OF INFLUENCE (1990).
6 Id.
, Id. at 4-6.
65 Id.
"Id.
6, CHOATE, supra note 62, at 4-6.
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U.S. were extremely attractive, as well (see III., infra).6 From
the perspective of a tiny island nation with overworked re-
sources, the wide open spaces and relatively clean air of Amer-
ica's heartland seemed like paradise. The state governments which
sought to attract these plants also promised to exert the political
influence necessary to acquire any permits (such as environmen-
tal permits) or waivers. When the sites and guaranteed lobbying
power were combined with extensive roads, tax incentives, and
payment for employee training, as well as the added advantage
of operating as an American business with respect to tariffs and
duties for shipping products into the U.S., the benefits of relo-
cation simply became too appealing to refuse. 69
Summarily, the Japanese auto manufacturers had numerous
reasons to find expansion to the United States financially ad-
vantageous. First, the Japanese could avoid tariffs imposed upon
incoming goods while leaving numerous open spaces in their
import quotas for extra vehicles (e.g., light trucks) which are
not manufactured in the U.S., allowing Japan to increase its
share of the American market. 70 Another important factor with
respect to the incentive packages is the easing of a stigma which
some consumers in the U.S. attach to foreign products. When
economic times are tough, foreign imports are often blamed for
the increase in unemployment. Since Americans have less of a
tendency to object to corporations employing their neighbors
and operating within their communities, the Japanese seek to
blend in, integrating their families into the American cultural
fiber.
71
Although financial incentives granted to the relocating com-
pany are considerable (see III., infra), economic incentives alone
do not seem to be the ultimate deciding factor. Perhaps the area
where Japan benefits the most is by taking advantage of the
regulatory framework in the United States. After examining
Japanese environmental law on the domestic front, it becomes
apparent that the Japanese have the laws, skills, and regulatory
policies to specifically enforce environmental regulations, as well
ERNEST J. YANAREU.A & WILLAM C. GREEN, THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL
RECRUITMENT: JAPANESE AuToMoBILE INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE
AMIUCAN STATES 53-84 (1990).
" Gonzalez & Rodriguez, supra note 4.
" CHOATE, supra note 62, at 4-6.
7 GELSANLITER, supra note 6, at 169-84.
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as the absolute necessity to do so. 2 The overburdened environ-
ment of Japan has caused the question of regulation to go far
beyond the level of an "either/or" proposition. For this reason,
and since the Japanese auto industry no longer requires nurtur-
ing, it has become subject to all environmental legislation en-
acted; the government knows it may act without sabotaging the
manufacturing concerns themselves. The realities of regulation
hit home with these corporations when such standards as emis-
sions controls are not relaxed even at the urging of the auto
manufacturers. 73 Japanese environmental law is thus enforceable,
with substantial specificity to preclude discretion. Companies
may, quite simply, be forced to pay if they play.
74
In the United States, however, discretionary authority vested
in the EPA allows for the interpretation of laws which have a
great deal of linguistic flexibility. Although the two nations have
similar laws, their application is quite disparate. Thus, an agency
decision which promotes financial gain at the expense of the
environment may well pass the necessary muster.
Finally, Japanese corporations realize that their country has
no intention of applying its laws extraterritorially. 5 Japan is
strictly committed to sovereignty and believes that the applicable
laws in any country are the domestic regulations which apply to
that country's nationals. Consequently, the corporation is al-
lowed to operate free of any regulatory pressure from its own
country.
76
As a parallel, the United States has a class of corporations
which have established operations in Mexico to obtain the ben-
efits of cheaper operating costs, reduced environmental stan-
dards, and the duty-free entry of components for assembly.
77
They are able to avoid import tariffs and quotas, which leaves
them free to sell more vehicles .78 Additionally, as the Toyota
example illustrates, the company may avoid taxes and receive
funding for employee training and other requested items. 79 There
has even been some suggestion that the Environmental Permits
,2 GRESSER ET AL., supra note 21, at 229-34.
" Id. at 58.
', Id. at 233.
" Id. at 355.
" Id. at 374.
" Gonzalez & Rodriguez, supra note 4.
7 CHOATE, supra note 62, at 4-6.
" See Hayes v. State Property & Bldgs. Comm'n., 731 S.W.2d 797 (1987).
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required for various actions taken by Toyota were pushed through
for approval.10 In the 1980's and 1990's, Japanese plants which
established operatives in the United States became a type of
"maquiladora" operation, leaving its own country to take ad-
vantage of economic incentives available elsewhere. However,
these "runaways" must be made to conform to the stricter laws
established by their own countries, or the international environ-
ment will continue to suffer the consequences."'
III. Ti TOYOTA EXAMPLE
A. How the Japanese Came to the Bluegrass
When Toyota began looking for a place to base its U.S.
operations, Kentucky was only one possibility in a competitive
field. Having already lost the battle with Tennessee as a location
for the Saturn plant, however, governor Martha Layne Collins
was determined that Toyota would make the Bluegrass region
its American home. 2 Eight trips to Japan and a $125 million
incentive package later, Toyota began constructing an assembly
plant in Scott County, Kentucky.83 The path that finally led
Toyota to Georgetown is strewn with litigation, questionable
environmental evaluations, and bizarre constitutionality rul-
ings. 4 What the entire entanglement illustrates is the need for a
comprehensive international consensus on the environment, so
that internal governing bodies will not be faced with a choice
between human rights and increased economic benefits. What
happened with Toyota shows how overwhelming decisions can
be in a system which allows too much interpretive leeway to
parties which lack equality of bargaining power.
B. Toyota's Day in Court
Two cases stand out from the flurry of lawsuits that accom-
panied Toyota's impending arrival. The first of these is Com-
monwealth Transportation Cabinet Department v. Taub, in which
SGEI.SANLITER, supra note 6, at 89-90.
'j Alan Neff, Not in Their Backyards, Either: A Proposal for a Foreign Environ-
mental Practices Act, 17 ECOLoGY L. Q. 477 (1990).
GELSAMITER, supra note 6, at 77.
I ld. at 53.
" Id. at 78-79.
[VOL. 8:439
THE JAPANESE "MAQUILADORA"
a land condemnation proceeding allowed the state to acquire the
property necessary to build an access road to the Toyota plant8 5
One of the concessions made to facilitate Toyota's decision to
locate in Kentucky was the provision of a four-lane access road
to the Toyota property. Taub's farm stood in the path of this
construction, and the state of Kentucky authorized the acquisi-
tion of a right of way by land condemnation to facilitate instal-
lation of the road.
The first argument against the offer of the Toyota road was
that the acquisition mandate was issued from the Commerce
Cabinet before the Transportation Department was even made
aware of the road's proposed construction.' Under K.R.S.
177.081(1), the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet has singular
authority to make such designations, and then only in connection
with a comprehensive six-year plan of development or an emer-
gency.8" One factor for determining the necessity of a road
construction project is an evaluation of the site area in regard
to the needs of the surrounding community and the road's affect
on the area. There were no documented studies prepared, nor
was more than a cursory consideration made of the site in-
volved. 9 Another required assessment under K.R.S. 176.430 is
the impact on the environment, an issue which seems to have
received little, if any, consideration." No alternative plans ap-
pear to have been considered, nor was the potential for environ-
mental degradation fully assessed. Ultimately, "the powers that
be" at Toyota wanted a road, and the State of Kentucky gave
them one. Mr. Taub was unfortunate enough to be blocking the
path that Toyota had chosen to take to its "New Kentucky
Home."
The second case considered raises the key issue to which all
other litigation is tied: was the incentive package given to Toyota
by the state of Kentucky constitutional? The Kentucky Supreme
Court made an analysis of this question in Hayes v. State
Property & Buildings Commission and in so doing, apparently
created a constitutionality argument from whole cloth. 9 1
Dep't of Highways v. Taub, 766 S.W.2d 49 (1988).
I d. at 50-51.
Id. at 52.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §177.081(l)(Baldwin 1988)[hereinafter KRSI.
Taub, 766 S.W.2d at 52.
9 KRS § 176.430.
See Hayes v. State Property & Bldgs. Comm'n., 731 S.W.2d 797 (1987).
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The document which spawned this constitutional litigation
was Senate Bill 361, which detailed the incentives to be given to
Toyota in compensation for its selection of the Kentucky site.
92
First, the state purchased 1600 acres of land which it acquired
and developed at a cost of $35 million. 93 The state also agreed
to provide requested highway access, state-funded comprehensive
training programs for the employees, assistance with rezoning,
and help in securing foreign-trade-zone status. These elements
cost the state $125 million initially, which will result, after in-
terest, in an obligation of $385 million for the people of Ken-
tucky.
94
The Hayes case was an action by the State Property and
Buildings Commission seeking a declaration of rights against the
State Budget Director to proclaim the constitutionality of Senate
Bill 361. 95 The legislative act led to the provision of a fee simple
title to the 1600 acre tract of land in Georgetown, Kentucky,
with improvements to allow for the construction of an auto-
mobile manufacturing plant." Toyota was not required to pay
for this property, which was to be financed by revenue bonds
paid by appropriations made by the General Assembly now and
in the future.9 In other words, the people of Kentucky are
paying for the Toyota plant with their tax dollars. This cost was
supposed to be offset by aggregate "incremental taxes" resulting
from the development of the Toyota Industrial Project. 98 "In-
cremental Taxes" were defined rather laboriously in Senate Bill
361 and include revenues such as state corporate income taxes,
income tax on employees, property taxes, and the like. 99 The
idea of this offsetting the cost of the Toyota plant appears to
use the same line of reasoning that would apply if an individual
who built a $1 million house were to have the construction
funded by the state because the owner employed a large staff
and paid property taxes. Since the same amount of tax would
be assessed if Toyota paid for its own site, the money paid out
by the state is never effectively recovered. Although the executive
Id. at 798.





n Appellee's brief at 10, Hayes, 731 S.W.2d 797 (86-SC-918-TG).
S. 361, Reg. Sess., Ky Gen. Assembly (1986) at 7.
[VOL. 8:439
THE JAPANESE "MAQUMA.DOIA"
branch is free to implement policy which is beneficial to the
state and its citizens, such policy must conform to pre-existing
legislation and constitutional provisions.
Although the Toyota incentive package was intended to spur
economic growth, the method used to attract Toyota is quite
simply forbidden under Kentucky law. In Section 3 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution, the state is forbidden to grant credit or make
donations to private industry. 0O Although the state and the court
alike said that the bond issue for Toyota did not constitute such
a "grant or donation," the reasoning to support this conclusion
was singularly focused. When the court's final analysis is ex-
amined in context, it becomes difficult to see how this decision
was ever reached by an analysis of existing state law.10'
The first problem that arises involves the order in which the
activities leading up to the drafting of Senate Bill 361 occurred.
Once the opportunity to attract Toyota arose, Collins and the
Commerce Cabinet had no intention of letting it slip by. Con-
sequently, they put forth a "policy" of promoting economic
development in the Commonwealth and set about the acquiring
of Toyota in furtherance of this goal. Although the policy is
admirable, its furtherance arguably bordered on violation of
executive authority. 0 2 Once the legislature was in session, Senate
Bill 361 parroted an authorization of the actions which had
already been taken103
Next, Section 177 of the Kentucky Constitution forbids the
exclusive grant of funds or credit to private individuals or cor-
porations. 1°4 Toyota is a private corporation, however, with no
intention of establishing a business venture merely to serve the
people of Kentucky. 10t There is no exception given in the con-
stitution for the use to which the funds are applied, even if the
ultimate result is beneficial. The Court relied on a Virginia
decision, Almond v. Day, to say that if the state receives a
benefit from the transaction and its underlying financial obli-
gation, then no credit has been granted.'l° The cited case was
1 KY. CoNsT. §3.
, See generally, Ky. CONST. §§ 3, 171; see also, Turnpike Authority of Ky. v.
Wall, 336 S.W.2d 551 (1960).
'1 GELANLTER, supra note 6, at 78.
See generally S. 361, Reg. Sess., Ky. Gen. Assembly (1986).
KY. CONST. § 171.
Hayes v. State Property & Bldgs. Comm'n., 731 S.W.2d 797, 809 (Leibson, J.
dissenting).
1 Almond v. Day, 91 S.E.2d 660 (1956) (cited in Hayes, 731 S.W. 2d at 800).
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not decided under Kentucky law, however, and in this state, a
loan does not become less of a loan merely because it is used to
benefit the lender. Thus, the Toyota incentive package is still a
grant of funds to a private corporation, even if it was extended
to promote a valid public policy.
Although Appellee's brief denoted a "strong presumption of
validity" to the Senate Bill, it should be noted that Section 171
of the Constitution says that taxes are to "be levied and collected
only for public purposes."'0 In accordance with this provision,
the analysis of Toyota leads to only one conclusion: the company
is a private, for-profit corporation.108 The grant of credit for an
increase in tax revenues from other Kentucky taxpayers amounts
to a direct taking of public funds for private use. Kentucky
taxpayers are to pay the debt service on the Toyota bonds
through general taxes that flow through the Commerce Cabi-
net."°9 In this sense, the Kentucky taxpayers are being taxed to
support private industry.
Since taxation is permissible to serve a larger good, the
question of what constitutes a "public benefit," thus, becomes
an issue. Toyota was projected to employ 3,000 people when
completed, and this was the presumed public benefit to be re-
ceived." 0 Since that number is about 1/15 the size of the city of
Lexington and 1/7 the size of the University of Kentucky, it is
difficult to see how a public benefit would arise from this
construction. In Appellee's brief, it was stated that Kentucky
had a 4.5% unemployment rate. The breakdown of that rate by
geographic area was conspicuously absent from the analysis."'
What it fails to say is that Toyota did not even locate in a high
unemployment area, which might have shown more legitimacy
as a public benefit which could revitalize an economically-de-
pressed region beyond the sheer number of employees.
The idea of an incremental tax does not obligate Toyota in
any way."2 The accrued tax revenues that are to apply to the
cost of the Toyota site will not become applicable unless Toyota
sells to a third party."' No source of revenue to specifically
107 Hayes, 731 S.W.2d at 801.
-00 Id.
9 Appellee's Brief at 7-8, Hayes (86-SC-918-TG).
Hayes, 731 S.W.2d at 812.
See Appellee's Brief at 7, Hayes (86-SC-918-TG).
Hayes, 731 S.W.2d at 811 (Liebson, J. dissenting).
113 Appellant's Brief at 6-7, Hayes (86-SC-918-TG).
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reduce the debt is provided. The only security comes from the
assumption that the State of Kentucky will continue to back the
funding. 1
14
The Kentucky Supreme Court had previously invalidated
proposals for bond issues which committed the state beyond the
length of a legislative term. In Curlin v. Weatherby, the court
held in part that:
[wie think it is an inescapable conclusion that if a state agency
performing a major function of government obligates the funds
to be appropriated to it in future years, a debt of the state is
created, because the state cannot abandon or discontinue the
function and still continue to operate as a government."15
It is difficult to see how an obligation to make payment through
the Commerce Cabinet falls outside of what constitutes a grant
of credit under this theory.'
1 6
In another decision, the court held it was illegal for the
Turnpike Authority to make up a funding deficiency from the
general purpose fund. 117 This, too, is similar to the case before
the Court, because the general tax revenue of the state is being
used to fund the debt service on these bonds.
The only cases where validity was even construed for public
projects was if some sort of assessment for payment was made
to the benefitted party, and even then the Commonwealth was
not obligated beyond the current biennium." ' In this case, how-
ever, the project was private and the funding renewable for the
long term, even though the renewal is for two year increments.
The project produces no guaranteed revenue for the Common-
wealth and, indeed, creates a mandatory drain." 9 One legislator
explained the practical effect of this commitment when inter-
viewed by the court: "I don't think we could ever afford to
default. The economic impact on the state in future bond issues
would be pretty devastating."' 2 0 Justice Liebson showed great
11 Id. at 9-10.
" Curlin v. Weatherby, 275 S.W.2d 934 (1955) (quoted in Appellant's Brief at 13,
Hayes (86-SC-918-TG).
"I Hayes, 731 S.W.2d at 815-16 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
1,7 Turnpike Authority of Ky. v. Wall, 336 S.W.2d 551 (1960) (quoted in Appel-
lant's Brief at 13, Hayes (86-SC-918-TG).
Appellant's brief at 14, Hayes (86-SC-918-TG).
Id. at 15.
Id. at n. 12 (quoting Rep. Joe Clark, Deposition 55).
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skepticism in his dissent when he pondered what this action
constitutes if not a sale or a grant of credit. 12 1 After examining
the briefs and the decision of the court, that issue is still no
clearer.
If this case is to establish precedent, it would appear to allow
a state government to "buy" a company any time the unem-
ployment rates are high and to bill the cost to the taxpayers.
22
This plan would appear to facilitate an alarming trend as un-
employment rises in the United States. States will take whatever
action is necessary to secure jobs for their citizens, and without
a clearly defined national policy to regulate this competition,
the incentives can only increase. Unfortunately, the people who
benefit in terms of economic success are sold short in other
ways, and ultimately, everyone pays. No single group or indi-
vidual is at fault; rather, no one is in control, so every country
and corporation fights for whatever it can get.
On the environmental issues, the actions taken by the State
in allowing permits were obfuscated by a rushed procedure with
little administrative exploration. 23 The proposed road construc-
tion received only a cursory site inspection before it was ap-
proved, as well.1 24 One wonders if an environmental impact
statement might not have been a legitimate response to such a
major project. An environmental impact statement would obvi-
ously have indicated such problems as the groundwater distur-
bance on a neighboring farm, which had to be alleviated during
the course of the project by running pipes under the property.
25
A comprehensive study would also have revealed the history of
opposition that area residents had to such industrial degradation,
evidenced by their organized protest against the building of a
coal gasification plant near historic Royal Spring. The citizens
of Georgetown were also proud of their tradition of controlled
growth and planning, which allowed great sensitivity to the
impact expansion would have on the environmental and social
structure. 126 The groundwater problems arose when a wastewater
treatment plant was proposed that would dump 2.2 million
,2, Hayes, 731 S.W.2d at 810 (Liebson, J. dissenting).
W Id. at 811.
'2 GELSANLITER, supra note 6, at 89-90.
124 Dep't of Highways v. Taub, 766 S.W.2d 49, 50 (1988).
"' GELSANLITER, supra note 6, at 89-90.
"' YANARELLA & GREEN, supra note 68, at 158.
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gallons of treated waste per day into a local stream. Despite a
well-planned attack and a thoughtful appeal to the county board
of adjustments, the State assured area residents that the plant
was perfectly safe,' 27 The Scott County Board of Adjustments
heard the arguments, but they granted a conditional building
permit to Toyota that included provisions for monitoring and
routed the water around affected residents. The decisions were
being made higher up, and the governor's office was not intim-
idated by the protests.'28 The residents of Georgetown simply
did not have the time to band together with other concerned
citizens in the state to mount an effective attack. The argument
remained a battle fought by the upper-middle-class residents
whose farms were being affected and failed to include the legit-
imate concerns of the working-class citizens who would also be
affected. 29 This consideration leads to questions about what
other environmental damage, besides the obvious air pollution
created by a manufacturing facility, has been overlooked in the
push for economic benefit.
Finally, the State seemed to regard "satellite industries" as
a compelling benefit of this project. These industries, likewise,
produce a strain on the environment of Kentucky. Perhaps, since
these industries played a beneficial role in the State's incremental
tax assessment, they should also have been included in an envi-
ronmental impact assessment.
IV. DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL POLICY
A. National Sovereignty and Human Rights
The first attempt to establish an international system of
human rights was embodied in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, prepared by the United Nations General Assem-
bly in 1948. This document was intended to promote the digni-
fied treatment of human beings and respect for their fundamental
rights. 130 This resolution was followed by an International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1966, a
' Id. at 158-59.
I2s Id. at 160.
Id. at 160-61.
'3 U.N. Declaration, supra note 8.
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document which was ultimately adopted in 1976.' 3' The rights
contained therein pertained to an individual's relationship with
the state and other peoples. More recently, it has been suggested
that a clean environment should be officially recognized as a
fundamental human right. On August 31, 1989, Decision 1989/
108: Human Rights and the Environment was adopted by the
U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities. 13 2 This decision proposed a study of human
environmental rights for ". . .development of urgently needed
universal minimum standards regarding human environmental
rights."' 33
Such progress in the international perspective of human rights
becomes fraught with irony when the exploited resources at issue
lie within the borders of the United States. While the American
people look askance at U.S. corporations that operate in foreign
countries in order to derive economic benefits, 34 these same
individuals welcome foreign industry to the U.S. with open arms.
Americans are accustomed to dominance, and they fail to per-
ceive that their rights may also be exploited-"cooperation" has
too often become "submission."' 13 5 As exemplified by Toyota,
however, Americans are willing to sacrifice part of their envi-
ronment, and even allow their taxes to be used as incentives for
the polluter, as long as they believe they are being compensated
for their trouble.
36
Although the scale is not comparable, the exchange is not
really that different from the relation between the Mexican peo-
ple and the maquiladoras, whose pollutants choke the air over
Mexico: the people need jobs, and they are willing to give up
environmental integrity for a share of financial well-being.137 The
choice is a difficult one, and it should not fall to the citizens of
a state to make the choice between quality of environment and
economic gain. To achieve this goal, the fundamental human
"I International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
"I U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities, Decision 1989/108 (Aug. 31, 1989).
Id. at I.
,' Gonzalez & Rodriguez, supra note 4.
,3' YANARELLA & GREEN, supra note 68, at 201.
-6 Gonzalez & Rodriguez, supra note 4.
" WALDMAN, supra note 7, at 20; see also Catherine Tinker, Environmental Planet
Management by the United Nations: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come? 22
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 793.
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rights of every worker must become a priority, and national
governments must submit themselves to international environ-
mental regulation if a sustainable environment is ever to become
a reality. "' Rhetoric unfortunately lacks the power to clean the
air, detoxify the water, or give people back their dignity. The
U.N. must make finding a means to enforce its regulations a
primary goal. 39
B. Enforcing International Environmental Law
The United Nations is uniquely well-suited to collecting and
assimilating data that measures environmental harm as well as
making recommendations to mitigate the potential damages re-
sulting from this harm.'4 Unfortunately, the U.N. has been
unable to facilitate its environmental policies on a global scale
because it lacks an effective system of enforcement mechanisms.
The judicial rhetoric on the environment that has issued from
the International Court of Justice reflects the limited access to
this forum, for legal remedies compel the consideration of ad-
ditional organizations to police environmental violations.'
4'
Enforcement mechanisms have been suggested by various
groups. 14 First, the "legal experts group" of the World Com-
mission on the Environment raised the possibility of the creation
of a commission that would hear and address environmental
grievances.143 This type of system has been successful in resolving
human rights issues and refugee disputes. 144 The then Soviet
Union suggested the creation of "green cross" centers to collect
data on the environment and assess enforcement possibilities.
145
The "green cross" units could be mobilized quickly to the scene
of an environmental emergency to minimize its detrimental im-
pact. Like the successful peacekeeping force after which it was
modeled, its goal would be to contain disaster in an emergency
situation. 146
'3' Tinker, supra note 137, at 797.
1 Id.
140 Id. at 798.
- Id. at 798-800.
141 Id. at 805-08.
" Tinker, supra note 137, at 806.
10 Id. at 807. The Hague Declaration on the Environment recommended the estab-
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These enforcement problems and their proposed solutions
illustrate the biggest dilemma in international law: how to estab-
lish binding legislation for a group of sovereign states with
diverse goals and values. Sovereignty of the state incorporates
the theories of absolute control over internal action and freedom
from outside interference by other sovereigns in exercising these
controls. 47 This fundamental principal of a sovereign right is so
ingrained into members of the world social order that interna-
tional regulation of independent states and their private corpo-
rations is exceedingly difficult."8 The most compelling illustration
of the need for such enforcement occurs when civilized nations
sacrifice their rights within their own borders and, by doing so,
sell out their workers and their environment.
Beginning with the Stockholm Conference in 1972, industri-
alized nations attempted to set standards for environmental pro-
tection to act as an international frame of reference. 149 The
unfortunate drawback to these agreements is that states are not
legally bound by them unless they voluntarily submit themselves
to such international restrictions. 50 If a particular proposal does
not appear to further a state's national agenda, the state may
leave the document unsigned and thereby free itself to pursue
its goals at the expense of others.'
One possible method for dealing with countries that refuse
to sign agreements is to exclude them from the international
marketplace until they comply. An economic barrier might well
force action when pleading the case of the global environment
has not proven fruitful. If international market participants agree
on a common value system of environmental compliance, the
sovereignty of independent states is left intact. 5 2 Those states
which do not choose to comply could behave as they wished,
but they would be required to find a new market for their non-
conforming products. Ideally, states would incorporate the stan-
dards established as an international code of conduct into their
own national regulatory scheme. Failing formal compliance,
however, the pressures of customary behavior within a particular
" GEORGE ELAN, THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVREIoNrrY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 10
(1979).
Id. at 5.






field would be brought to bear upon the nonconforming state.'
Another difficulty arises when a company incorporated in
one country goes beyond its borders to establish operations in
areas where environmental regulation is less stringent, if indeed
it exists at all. 54 For the most part, the only U.S. law which has
been given extraterritorial force is the National Environmental
Policy Act, NEPA, and its application requires specifically that
the action have federal funding. 5 As a general rule, companies
that leave their sovereign's boundaries to pursue business ven-
tures correspondingly free themselves from the incorporating
country's environmental laws. 56 This issue finds its best illustra-
tion in the concept of "free trade." "Free trade" is a misnomer
based upon an economic system that views cost entirely in terms
of dollars and cents. Ultimately, however, any product placed
in the stream of commerce costs the environment, exploits some
precious resource (tangible or otherwise), and reduces the quality
of life at some level. This fact must be addressed as a global
issue in order to preserve a semblance of personal dignity and
environmental integrity for the people of all nations.'
One illustration of the attempt at tariff reduction and the
limitation of trade barriers is the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).' 8 This scheme of regulatory agreements
applies to the contracting parties in varying degrees, but the
primary goal has been to reduce trade restriction and eliminate
discrimination in international commerce. 9 Unfortunately, not
every country plays by the rules, so the system's impact is
considerably reduced. This experience should illustrate to the
United Nations that states need to have more than a document
detailing compliance before they will follow regulations.
The struggle to effect protection of the environment and
human rights on a global scale raises numerous issues, the sem-
inal consideration of which requires an answer for precisely how
to infuse intangible values into a system which operates in terms
of profits and losses on a balance sheet. The most obvious, and
' Id.
' ' Joan R. Goldfarb, Extraterritorial Compliance With NEPA Amid the Current
Wave of Environmental Alarm, 18 B.C. ENvTn. Art. L. REv. 543 (1991).
i" Id.
"6 WALDMA N, supra note 7, at 20-21.
"I Neff, supra note 81, at 478.
..8 GENTHER, supra note 2, at 124-25.
"I Id. at 124-25 (providing a summary of objective).
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likely the most effective means, to influence international envi-
ronmental and social policy is to simply make it economically
unsound to break the rules.
One proposal which has been suggested for protecting the
environment is the implementation of a Foreign Environmental
Practices Act. 160 Such an act would force companies which op-
erate beyond the boundaries of the states in which they are
incorporated to comply with the regulations of the originating
state. 61 Unfortunately, however, the proposal applies to the
United States and its corporations only. 62 While the logic behind
such an act is fundamentally sound, a broader application on
an international level would be necessary to make this regulation
meaningful. Since most countries have not attempted environ-
mental regulatory action on a scale even approaching that of the
United States, some ground rules would be necessary in order
to make the system effective.
An additional consideration which has come to the forefront
in the United States is making internal cohesion a mainstay of
industrial policy. 63 A national set of guidelines governing trans-
plant operations which seek to set up shop would eliminate
competition between states in manipulating their laws in order
to be able to give the biggest incentive package.'l There are no
winners, for each state arguably gives up more in incentives than
it can ever possibly regain with increased productivity. 165 Until
the United'States is able to look inward and guarantee its citizens
that their land and labor will not be an international bargaining
chip, any attempt at global policy by the U.S. will not ring true.
C. Establishing a Code of Conduct
The first rule must be a set of minimum international stan-
dards. Even in lesser-developed countries with no means of
enforcing environmental and social laws, the United Nations
should provide forces to police industrial behavior. For countries
with more resources, more stringent environmental laws, and a
's Neff, supra note 81, at 479-83.
161 Id. at 478.
'I ld. at 478-79.
3 YAJARELLA & GREEN, supra note 68, at 197-200 (focusing on the role of state
governments in industrial policy).
I ld. at 200.
,, Id. at 201.
[VOL. 8:439
THE JAPANESE "MAQUILADORA"
more protectionist attitude toward their citizens, foreign corpo-
rations should be forced to comply with the stricter of either the
laws of the host country or the state of incorporation.'6 The
funding for this enforcement system should flow from slight
taxes on items in international commerce and heavy fines against
corporations which act in violation of the minimum standards
required.
Next, because any manufacturing concern causes environ-
mental degradation by its very nature, all foreign corporations
should be required to pay a degradation tax, which would in
turn fund projects to improve the host nation's environment and
preserve its natural resources. 67 In addition, companies should
be required to get involved in the social framework of the host
country and contribute to the development of its people. Such
a system would aid the host country that recognizes the benefits
derived by the corporation from operating within its borders.
V. CONCLUSION: A LOOK TOWARD THE FUTURE
United States standards must follow U.S. citizens globally if
this planet is to be preserved for another generation. But as
Americans look out at the world, they must never ignore what
goes on within their own borders. The U.S. must demand higher
standards from foreign interests operating within its borders, lest
the American landscape be defiled by a special breed of "ma-
quiladora." 1
6
Probably the most critical issue that faces a nation regarding
environmental compliance is precisely what regulations are man-
dated by international environmental law. The vaguely defined
standard is derived from Principle 21 of the Stockholm Decla-
ration on Human Rights. 69 The essence of this conduct code is
that international environmental law obligates the states to reg-
ulate internal activities to the degree necessary to prevent external
harm. 70 Unfortunately, this sovereignty standard carries little
weight because a state may still emit damaging pollutants as
long as a neighboring state does not feel itself to be harmed.
" Neff, supra note 81, at 516-21.
.67 Id.
'' Gonzalez & Rodriquez, supra note 4.
' U.N. Declaration, supra note 8.
, Id.
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The tragedy is that the commons are degraded by every act
of pollution. The environment belongs to everyone, and even-
tually everyone is harmed by environmental damage. Although
precise issues have been addressed by treaties and agreements,
specific action has failed to achieve any real protection for the
environment as a whole. While treaties regarding migratory birds,
fishing rights, and even trade in endangered species have been
quite successful, some type of regulatory framework that re-
quires a specific code of conduct for all environmental issues is
imperative.'
7'
The argument for protecting human dignity is no less com-
pelling. The work conditions and standards of treatment which
are faced by the international labor force should never be dic-
tated by the lowest common denominator. No group of indivi-
duals should ever have to decide that losing part of their
autonomy is reasonable for the maintenance of their employment
situation. Beginning within each country, uniform standards must
be set. The time has come for each nation to monitor its do-
mestic industrial policy to see that foreign corporations operating
within its borders respect both the letter and spirit of the law.
Each nation is its own worst enemy where its citizens and its
environment are concerned, for outsiders will do as much dam-
age as we will allow. The time has come at last to declare a
truce.
- Tinker, supra note 137, at 825-28.
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